Instructions
For the following questions, assume that the State of Springfield is the 51st State of the United States. Springfield is like many states, with a bicameral legislature that enacts statutes, and a tripartite judicial system, with a trial court (Springfield Court of Common Pleas), intermediate appellate court (Springfield Court of Appeals), and supreme court (Springfield Supreme Court). Springfield has two federal judicial districts, the Western District and the Eastern District. Springfield’s federal district courts fall within a new federal court of appeals, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 13th Circuit. Assume that all matters take place in federal court and that diversity of citizenship and the amount in controversy are satisfied.
Questions & Explanations
| 1. Sideshow Bob gets angry at Krusty the Clown and starts a website at KRUSTYTHECLOWNREALLYREALLYSUCKS.COM. Springfield Gen. Stat. § 10-717 provides a statutory cause of action for cybersquatting (registering, trafficking, or using a domain name with the bad faith intent to profit where the domain name is identical or confusingly similar to the plaintiff’s trademark). The state statute provides for either actual damages, or at the plaintiff’s election, statutory damages of up to $1,000,000. Federal law provides a concurrent form of relief, a federal cybersquatting cause of action that allows parallel relief to any state recovery, but the statutory damages under the federal cybersquatting statute are $100,000 per domain name. If Krusty sues Sideshow under the Springfield statute, may he demand $1,000,000 statutory damages? | Discussion: Yes. This hypo raises the threshold question of whether there is even a conflict. What we have here are two statutes – one state, one federal – that provide causes of action for the same underlying misconduct (Sideshow Bob’s cybersquatting). There are many areas where federal law and state law co-exist to provide remedies for the same kind of misconduct. One example of areas covered by both state and federal law include antitrust, where there are federal and state antitrust statutes. Another area is trademark law: there are both federal and state trademark statutes. Unless we have reason to believe that Congress intended to displace (preempt) state law using its Supremacy Clause power, there is no reason why the two statutes cannot co-exist. Here, the federal law limits statutory damages for purposes of the federal cause of action; it says nothing about other causes of action. Thus, Krusty may demand $1,000,000 under the state statute. |
| 2. In 1928, the Springfield Supreme Court held that a plaintiff who is found to be contributorily negligent cannot recover any damages in a suit for negligence. Since then, many states (via common law or legislative enactment) have abandoned the harsh rule of contributory negligence for various formulations of comparative negligence, which generally serve to reduce a plaintiff’s recovery without completely barring it. In 2015, Seymour sues Bart for running him over with a skateboard. Bart moves for dismissal, arguing that Seymour is barred by contributory negligence because he was not watching where he was walking, instead eyeing Edna. What is the relevant state law? | Discussion: A federal court must predict how the relevant state supreme court would rule. Here, the Springfield Supreme Court ruled nearly 90 years ago and has not spoken since. A federal court’s job is to predict what the state supreme court would hold, and can choose not to follow the old precedent if subsequent developments (such as trends in law, court dicta, legislation) call into question the 1928 holding. |
| 3. Same facts as problem 2. The U.S. District Court of the Western District of Springfield holds that the Springfield Supreme Court would stick to the contributory negligence rule and dismisses the case. On appeal, the judges of the Court of Appeals for the 13th Circuit feel that they should follow the reasoning of the district judge, the Hon. Selma Bouvier, because she served in Springfield state courts for 15 years before joining the federal bench. May the Court of Appeals defer to Judge Bouvier? | Discussion: No. The Supreme Court held in Salve that an appellate court should give no deference to a district judge’s prediction of state law. |
| 4. Same facts as problem 2, but two opinions of the Springfield Court of Appeals criticize contributory negligence. What is the relevant state law? | Discussion: The federal court is not bound by the enunciations of the state appellate court but should give “proper regard” to those enunciations. The statements of the state appellate courts here, of course, are dicta, but the federal district court should consider them in making its prediction of how the state supreme court would rule. |
| 5. Same facts as problem 2, but in 1989, the Springfield Supreme Court reaffirmed the contributory negligence rule. What is the relevant state law? | Discussion: Here, the state supreme court reaffirmed its adherence to the contributory negligence rule after other courts and states had called the rule into question. Unless the district court can point to reasons why the Springfield Supreme Court would change its mind now, the federal court will likely choose contributory negligence as the relevant state law. |
| 6. Mr. Burns sues Homer for gross negligence arising from Homer’s falling asleep on his job at the Springfield nuclear power plant. He files suit in the Western District of Springfield. Homer seeks a venue transfer to the Eastern District of Springfield for the convenience of the witnesses and parties. Mr. Burns objects to transfer of venue, arguing that under Springfield state court rules, venue transfer is permitted only in “extraordinary circumstances.” Homer concedes that extraordinary circumstances do not exist. May the district court transfer the suit? | Discussion: Yes. Here we have a conflict between the federal venue convenience transfer statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), and state law. Pursuant to Stewart v. Ricoh, a federal statute trumps a state law: 1) if the federal statute covers the question also covered by the state statute; and 2) if the federal statute reflects a valid exercise of Congress’ authority. First, both laws cover the same question, the standard for venue transfer for convenience. Second, section 1404(a) is valid. Congress has power under Article III and the Necessary & Proper Clause to enact statutes that govern the procedure of federal courts. Section 1404(a) is more than arguably procedural because it determines when cases can be transferred between federal courts. |
| 7. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 3 states “A civil action is commenced by filing a complaint with the court.” Springfield court rules indicate that a statute of limitation is tolled only by actual service. One day before the statute of limitations expires, Milhouse sues Lisa for breach of a promise to marry him. Service of the summons and complaint is not done until two weeks later. Lisa moves to dismiss, citing the statute of limitations. How should the court decide? | Discussion: The analysis you’d do (Hanna I or Hanna II) would hinge on whether you read Rule 3 broadly (conflict between state law and Federal Rule – Hanna II) or narrowly (conflict between state law and federal judicial practice – Hanna I). In an exam hypo, if the Rule could be read both ways then you’ll have to do both a Hanna I and Hanna II analysis. Sometimes courts read Federal Rules broadly, and sometimes courts read Federal Rules narrowly to avoid a conflict. The unassigned case of Gasperini suggests (without apparently holding) that Federal Rules should be read with sensitivity to important state interest and regulatory policies. In Walker, the Court read Rule 3 narrowly so that it did not govern the tolling of a statute of limitations in a diversity case. More recently in Shady Grove, the Supreme Court read Rule 23 to conflict with a New York statute that barred maintenance of a class action that seeks to recover a penalty. Justice Scalia limited Gasperini’s “sensitive” reading of Federal Rules to those Rules that were ambiguous. However, Justice Scalia (in a plurality) concluded that Rule 23 was not ambiguous. See Shady Grove n.7. |
| 8. Same facts as problem 7, but assume that FRCP 3 is amended to state “A civil action is commenced by filing a complaint with the court; moreover, such filing shall toll any applicable statute of limitations.” How should the court decide? | Discussion: Now we have a direct conflict between Rule 3 and state law because both expressly govern the tolling of the statute of limitations. This is Hanna II (Constitution & Rules Enabling Act analysis). First, ask if new FRCP 3 is constitutional? Federal Rules are presumed to be constitutional because they have been reviewed by Congress, the Supreme Court and others before becoming effective. They are constitutional if they are “arguably procedural,” even if falling into the uncertain area between substance and procedure. Federal Rules are also presumed to be valid under the Rules Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2072 for the reasons noted above regarding the presumption of constitutional validity. Then, you’ll have to analyze 2072(a) (does the Rule govern practice and procedure in federal courts) and 2072(b) (does the Rule abridge, enlarge, or modify any substantive right). However, the proper analysis for Section 2072 is somewhat unclear in light of the Supreme Court’s plurality decision in Shady Grove. Compare Justice Scalia’s opinion (with at most four total Justices) with Justice Steven’s concurring opinion. |
| 9. Barney drank too much Duff’s Beer at Moe’s Tavern. Moe said goodnight to Barney; because Moe didn’t think Barney was drunk, Moe let him leave. On the way home, Barney passed out, falling on Lenny and Carl, nearly crushing them. Lenny and Carl sue Barney and Moe. Springfield common law – as enunciated repeatedly by the Springfield Supreme Court – states that a bar owner or bartender is strictly liable to any person for harm caused to a plaintiff by a bar patron who harms the plaintiff, when the harmful acts were proximately caused by the consumption of alcohol at the bar. In December 2015, new Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 100, takes effect. FRCP 100 states that bar owners shall have no liability for damages caused to any person by a drunken patron unless the bartender knew or had reason to know that the patron was intoxicated when leaving the bar. (Apparently Barney and Moe had powerful friends amongst the rulemakers.) Barney and Moe move to dismiss on the basis of FRCP 100. How should the court rule on Moe’s motion? How should the court rule on Barney’s motion? | Discussion: Moe’s motion should be denied. Regarding Moe’s motion, it’s hard to see how Rule 100 would pass muster under any part of the Hanna II analysis. First, there might be constitutional problems – the Rule doesn’t even arguably govern procedure; instead, it provides a substantive rule of law. (On the other hand, the Rule might be constitutional under the Commerce Clause. Think about that next year in Con Law.) Second, it doesn’t govern practice and procedure in federal courts because it concerns liability and not in-court matters, so 2072(a) is violated. Finally, the Rule does appear to enlarge, abridge, or modify substantive law by defining the duty of care in Lenny and Carl’s claim, regardless of whether we use the interpretation of 2072(b) put forth by Scalia or Stevens in Shady Grove. Instead, Rule 100 is a substantive rule of decision that is an utterly inappropriate (albeit hypothetical!) addition to the FRCP. Thus, Rule 100 is invalid and Moe’s motion to dismiss should be denied. Regarding Barney’s motion, it should also be denied, for two reasons. First, Rule 100 is invalid. Second, even it were valid, Barney is not a bartender. He’s a drunk guy who fell on Lenny and Carl. |
Revised Feb. 26, 2015